Summary of My Bachelor's Thesis
From the Continental Alliance to New Route: A Study on the Transition of the Foreign Policy of the Second German Reich
From the German unification in 1871 to the end of World War I in 1918, Germany’s foreign policy can be divided into three stages: the Continental Alliance Policy (1871-1890), the New Route Policy (1890-1897), and the World Policy (1897-1918). Bismarck’s essential judgment was that without the support of another major European power, France would not seek revenge alone. Therefore, the Continental Alliance system centered on isolating France. Bismarck achieved this goal by excluding France and involving Russia, aiming to ensure that Germany always maintained a position among the three powers of Europe, establishing alliances with the House of Hohenzollern, Romanov, and Habsburg. At the same time, Bismarck understood that the Triple Alliance was not set in stone, so he created a network of alliances through a series of secret treaties to provide flexibility for allies’ obligations. This balance system was intricate yet extremely fragile, constantly threatened by waves of nationalism, increasingly relying on the vision and wisdom of its helmsman. Bismarck sought to show other great powers that Germany was a satisfied state, seeking nothing but peace. However, under Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germany became increasingly greedy, demanding broader colonies and aspiring to become the leading power. On November 13, 1897, the German Navy forcibly occupied Kiautschou Bay and subsequently established it as a leased territory, marking the start of the World Policy. Germany no longer defended the existing international order but had become its challenger. By developing the navy, seizing colonies, and expanding its sphere of influence to vast regions from East Africa to Jerusalem and the Far East, Germany became a threat to almost all European powers. The World Policy is the product of Wilhelm II and his government’s arrogance and rising nationalism. This aggressive strategy led Germany to bear partial responsibility for the outbreak of World War I.
This thesis focuses on the New Route Policy, the transition strategy of the Second German Reich from the Continental Alliance to World Policy. The historical literature referenced in this study mainly includes Bismarck’s memoirs Gedanken und Erinnerungen and memoirs written by William II. Additionally, there is Die groβe Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871— 1914: Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, which is a collection of diplomatic documents of the German Second Empire from 1871 to 1914, including treaties, memoranda, correspondence between diplomats. Using qualitative methods such as textual analysis, case studies, and historical review, this study aims to explain the background and content of the New Route Policy, as well as the specific measures it implemented. The paper further evaluates the catastrophic consequences the policy caused.
From 1887 to 1890 marked the end of Bismarck’s rule, during which his government faced numerous domestic and international challenges. The success of the Second Industrial Revolution significantly changed Germany’s social balance: export-oriented merchants, Social Democrats, and left-wing liberals continued to grow in strength. Driven by economic interests and nationalist sentiments, they increasingly pressured the German government to adopt a worldview centered on the whole globe rather than Europe and to participate in the wave of colonial expansion. At the same time, Germany’s protectionist policies to safeguard agriculture and heavy industry deepened economic conflicts with Russia. The political conflicts between Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Balkan Peninsula also became irreconcilable. Consequently, economic and military ties between France and Russia intensified. In these predicaments, the most fatal blow was Bismarck losing the support and trust of Kaiser Wilhelm II. All diplomatic policies originated from domestic issues, and personnel changes heralded policy shifts. On March 18, 1890, Bismarck resigned as Chancellor. Leo von Caprivi and Friedrich August von Holstein became the architects of German foreign policy. This paper selects two cases, the German refusal to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia and the signing of the Treaty of Helgoland-Zanzibar between Germany and Britain, to study the content and strategic logic of the New Route Policy. For the new German government, Bismarck’s foreign policy was ambiguous and often contradictory. However, this was precisely Bismarck’s brilliance: Germany, surrounded by vast nations, needed to utilize the information asymmetry in the era of secret diplomacy to create a vague situation, thus avoiding making actual commitments and getting involved in unnecessary disputes. As an alternative, the New Route Policy was a more clear-cut diplomatic strategy, but it also led to Germany losing strategic maneuverability. Its core was to distance itself from Russia, be friendly with Britain, and defend Austria-Hungary.
The disastrous consequences of the New Route Policy manifest in two aspects. Firstly, Germany completely lost its friendship with Russia. By abandoning the Reinsurance Treaty, Germany deprived Russia of security guarantees, forcing it to seek new partners. Naturally, Russia turned its gaze to another isolated country, France, which was also willing to provide economic support to Russia. The signing of the Treaty of Helgoland-Zanzibar relieved Britain of concerns in the Mediterranean-Egypt region, allowing it to divert more resources to India, Afghanistan, and even the Far East, thus increasing pressure on Russia’s interests in those areas. Russia needed to ally with colonial powers like France to alleviate these strategic pressures. As a result, in August 1891, Russia and France established a political agreement of mutual friendship, taking substantial steps towards forming a formal military alliance. The New Route Policy also failed to achieve its goal of winning over Britain. Germany’s overly eager attitude to reach an agreement exposed its bottom line to Britain, rendering it unnecessary for Britain to fear Germany in the short term. Germany believed it had gained Britain’s friendship, but the reality was that as a democratic country, no government in Britain could maintain long-term rule, so bonds based on interests were far more reliable than those based on goodwill. Instead of warming, British attitudes towards Germany grew increasingly cold, and the two countries drifted apart, intensifying the underlying contradictions between rising and status quo powers.
The New Route Policy reveals to the world that, in the age of imperialism, politicians were not pursuing absolute, universal peace; their desire was merely for peaceful coexistence among great powers. European nations actively expanded outward, bringing the flames of war to other continents and peoples. War was tolerated as long as it erupted outside of Europe. Decision-makers often viewed war as a tool on the diplomatic chessboard, even intentionally provoking conflicts through threats, intimidation, and extortion to achieve diplomatic victories. This selfish, narrow view of peace eventually backfired on the European powers. People realized that the decisive events leading to their deteriorating relationships mostly did not occur in Berlin, Paris, or London but rather in the Balkans, Cairo, and other areas considered “marginal” and “uncivilized.”