A Decisive Moment for Germany
The war in Ukraine is showing worrying signs of escalation. French President Macron’s refusal to back down on the possibility of Western troops in Ukraine has raised concerns that the war could spill over the country’s borders. This is a significant test for Germany. From a historical perspective, Germany engaged in two wars with Russia in the twentieth century, both resulting in disastrous outcomes. Notably, the terrible losses inflicted by the Soviet Union on Germany during the Second World War have deeply imprinted on the collective psyche of the country. From a practical standpoint, the lack of personnel, logistical capabilities, and the increasingly bureaucratic nature of the German Bundeswehr shows that they are not yet prepared for war. In this context, the challenge for the German government is, first, how to reaffirm its commitment to strengthening Ukraine’s defenses while avoiding over-provoking Russia. Second, how to bridge the strategic divide with France. This dilemma is the German question of our time.
After World War II, Germany was a well-protected country. NATO and the EU took on the responsibility of maintaining Germany’s defense and security, and under the US commitment, weakness and ambiguity were the main features of Germany’s security strategy. Pacifism was the cornerstone of Germany’s post-war reconstruction and the source of pride for the reborn German nation. In the face of international conflict, Germany prefers to take a moral persuasion approach rather than deterrence or realist foreign policy. Germany is content to be a civilian power, that is, to influence the global system without relying on military force in its foreign relations. This strategy was appropriate and in line with the international community’s expectations of Germany in the late 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. However, with the shift of global power and the decline in the strength and reputation of Western powers, the international community expects Germany to step up and take on greater responsibility for maintaining peace and multilateralism. This desire has become increasingly strong among European countries, especially after Russia has taken increasingly aggressive policies in Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine. Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski once claimed in a speech in Berlin: “I fear German power less than German inaction.” He was the first diplomat in Polish history to express this view, showing that the country would support Germany in recognizing its European leadership responsibilities. “Europe clearly faces a moment when it will be necessary not to be cowards,” French President Emmanuel Macron said on March 2024, in comments that appeared to be aimed at Chancellor Scholz.
At first glance, these voices calling for Germany to lead Europe are inspiring. In the 20th century, Germany’s two attempts to seek leadership in Europe ended in tragic disasters. Now, it seems that Germany can finally achieve this goal peacefully, leveraging moral superiority. However, because these calls essentially demand that Germany become more actively involved in confrontation with Russia, this would greatly harm Germany’s security and interests. After two years of fighting, the Russo-Ukrainian war has reached a stalemate, with neither side demonstrating significant progress. In such a war of attrition, Russia, with its richer resources, larger population, and more comprehensive industrial base, undoubtedly holds the advantage. No country can win, relying primarily on foreign aid. Assisting Ukraine in a prolonged war against military superpowers like Russia requires immense and sustained effort as well as strong determination. The regrettable reality is that political support from Western countries for Ukraine’s aid is diminishing. A comprehensive victory for Ukraine is an unrealistic goal, and ideally, Germany should ensure that Ukraine has sufficient resources to deter Russian advances while expediting the start of peace negotiations. However, the Russo-Ukrainian war has been imbued with too much moral significance, with discussions about ‘just war’ or ‘pacifism’ obscuring a reality: Germany is sandwiched between two land powerhouses, France and Russia. Any disaster leading to Moscow or Paris would undoubtedly pass through Berlin. During the Thirty Years’ War, due to Germany’s fragmentation and weakness, Germans could not control their destiny, and the European powers made this region the main battleground for hegemony, leading to unprecedented disaster. This reminds the German government that a unified Germany should prioritize preventing the German people from once again falling into war. Germany’s power should be used to expand its strategic choices and safeguard national security rather than satisfy other countries’ ambitions and vanity. Chancellor Scholz’s desire and efforts as “peace chancellor” are commendable; pragmatism and caution have always been virtues attributed to the German government.
At the end of the day, Germany’s peace and prosperity depend on balancing the power and the ambitions of both ends of the European continent. Diplomacy with France and diplomacy with Russia are equally important. If the differences between other major European countries are guaranteed to be greater than their differences with Germany, allowing Germany to always play the role of mediator in crises, then Germany will not only be at the geographical center of Europe but also strategically. As the game of deterrence between France and Russia escalates, Germany should strengthen communication with both sides, especially enhancing dialogue with Russia, to promote understanding and mitigate hostility. These efforts will accumulate goodwill and lay the groundwork for peace negotiations afterward. Helping other countries achieve military victories is leadership, but equally remarkable leadership lies in preventing the escalation of war and ending it. In a realist, power-based international system, German politicians need courage and imagination to make Germany a bridge for communication between East and West, rather than a battlefront of conflict.